How to fix Europe, Part 2

One of the long-standing criticisms of the euro is that a monetary union cannot survive without political union. The United States can use one currency even though it consists of states with their own budgets, rights and economic conditions because, in the end, a national government is in place to solve crises, transfer funds and coordinate policy. No one worries that if California goes bust, the entire union will fall apart. In Europe, however, the individual countries using the euro have been to a great degree left to their own devices. They lost control over monetary policy of course, and they were supposed to adhere to certain limits on the size of their budget deficits and sovereign debt. But the system never worked as intended. In Greece, the government simply lied about the state of its national finances. Even when it was clear a government was breaking the rules, the European Union never properly enforced them.

The dangers of this oddball mixture of the supranational and the sovereign state have been blatantly exposed in the current debt crisis. A handful of Eurozone members, and for the most part, small and peripheral ones, were able to nearly destroy the entire union with their fiscal irresponsibility. But what can be done about this problem? Can Europe achieve a “fiscal union” to match its monetary union?

The talk in Europe is about the formation of some kind of “economic government,” some way of better coordinating national economy policies across the entire Eurozone. The European Commission, the executive body of the EU, has already started the debate over such a “government” by proposing a new system to oversee the state budgets of individual members. You can read some of the details of the plan here. The general idea is to put in place a mechanism whereby Eurozone governments would submit their budget plans in advance for review by the EU, which would then offer what the Commission called “guidance” to each state. This process would be backed up by the stricter use of sanctions on those governments which flout the rules of the Eurozone. Here’s what Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, had to say about these proposals in a statement:

Coordination of fiscal policy has to be conducted in advance, in order to ensure that national budgets are consistent with the European dimension, that they don’t put at risk the stability of the other member states…For euro-area it means deeper and broader surveillance, in particular with regard to macroeconomic imbalances.

We’re basically talking about some kind of pre-approval process of national budgets at an EU level. But can such a system work? The basic problem with any such proposals is that the EU may simply not have the tools, the will or the power to control the actions of the otherwise independent governments. It hasn’t so far. And I’m not sure simple fines or other penalties would be enough to convince politicians with their own local interests and priorities to fall back into line. Would the EU threaten to toss a wayward nation out of the Eurozone, a form of financial excommunication? I can’t imagine that happening.

And if the EU can’t be trusted to enforce policy, the individual countries can’t be trusted either. The Greece case shows how governments have all kinds of tools at hand to hide reality. Javier Díaz-Giménez, an economist at IESE Business School in Madrid, argues that one solution is to base the formation of government budgets not on estimates of revenues and growth calculated in national capitals, but by the technocrats of the EU. That would ensure forecasts weren’t based on local politics, eliminating the emergence of unexpected deficits and debt. For Díaz-Giménez, greater fiscal coordination is truly a life or death matter for the euro. “You can’t have a single currency without fiscal policy coordination,” he told me. “If we don’t do this we won’t have a euro.”

He might be right. But will the Eurozone states really go for any of these ideas? The problem is the same as it always has been – Europe has wanted the benefits of economic integration without the sacrifices of political integration. How much power do Europe’s politicians and voters want to turn over to the administration in Brussels? I think we can all appreciate the hesitation. The politics of the EU are dominated by its most powerful members, Germany and France. Will the Eurozone’s smaller members, let’s say the Netherlands or Portugal, surrender more sovereignty to the Germans and the French? Would you?

Yet there does seem to be some feeling in Europe that a form of fiscal union is inevitable. Jaime Malet, the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Spain, told me that Europe’s states have already given up their sovereignty on all kinds of lesser issues, and the resistance on fiscal policy may eventually give way as well. Fiscal coordination”is a sensitive issue, but I don’t know why,” he says.

The basic point here is that without greater integration in Europe, the Eurozone is going to remain unstable.

Related Topics: Economy & Policy
  • Latest on Business

    Associated Press

    Small Dairies Go Under as Milk Prices Sink Again

    PLAINFIELD, Vt. — The MacLaren brothers are third-generation dairy farmers, but they will likely be the last in their family.

    After working all their lives on the hillside farm in Vermont that their grandfather bought in 1939, rising to milk cows at 3 a.m., even in blizzards and sub-zero temperatures, they decided to call it quits, auctioning off their roughly 200 cows and equipment ranging from stalls and hoof trimmers to tractors and steel pails.

    Why Greece Isn't Leaving the Eurozone YetSlate

    Getty Images

    The Term “Pink Collar” Is Silly And Outdated — Let’s Retire It

    You can’t throw a stone around the internet today (if that’s even possible?) without running into the New York Times’ new study on so-called “pink-collar jobs.” The report found that over the last decade more and more men have flocked to traditionally female-dominated career fields like nursing and teaching. Fascinatingly, the study disproves the commonly held belief that this transition is the result of the recession, proving that men’s migration into the pink isn’t out of some alleged desperation. Men want those jobs.

  • deconstructiva

    Would the EU threaten to toss a wayward nation out of the Eurozone, a form of financial excommunication? I can’t imagine that happening.

    Why not, Michael? No doubt giving up on the Euro is unlikely, but I seriously wonder if Germany’s tired of carrying the Euro (and PIIGS) on its back and desires going back to flying solo with the Deutsche Mark. Traders would take their currency seriously; Greece less so. But if anyone leaves Euro / tossed out, would these weaker players face the risk of currency runs?

  • http://rodgermmitchell.wordpress.com Rodger Malcolm Mitchell

    “Can Europe achieve a “fiscal union” to match its monetary union?”

    225 years ago, 13 independent nations did exactly that, to form the United States of America. It required each nation to surrender its sovereignty to achieve a whole greater than the sum of its parts.

    However, these 13 nations did not have a history of inter-state warfare, jealousy and mutual hatred the Europeans have nurtured for centuries.

    Europe’s salvation would be to form a “United States of Europe,” but their histories prevent it. The euro, as presently constituted, is doomed. The EU nations will lose power as monetarily sovereign nations like the U.S., China, Japan, India, Canada and Australia grow in power.

    Any nation tossed out of the EU would benefit, by once again being sovereign over its own currency. Greece, for instance, would be far better off, if it were “excommunicated” from the EU.

    Rodger Malcolm Mitchell

  • danallen2

    I already replied to Mr. Schuman’s contention about Greece “lying” about its statistics a while back, but apparently, he has yet to read the Eurostat report of January 10, 2010 on Greek Statistics. It is right on Eurostat’s home page. In that report, Eurostat states that while Greece gave inaccurate predictive statistics each year, Eurostat conducted a methodological review each year and printed the actual statistics. This is why the stats show Greece as having the same debt to GDP it had in 2008-2009 every year throughout the decade. For the same reason, the IMF has been writing yearly reports warning of Greece’s debt problems. In short, no one was surprised, since each year Greece’s predicted deficit was revised at the end of the year to actual deficit. Nothing changed this year.

    The “lie” story–though it accurately describes the Greek mess with statistics–is convenient because it leaves out the part about the yearly revision. It allows the new Greek PM to blame the debt troubles on the old Greek PM, even though the new guy’s party is complicit since the debt is longstanding. It allows Europe and especially French finance minister Lagarde to argue that Greece is an outlier because it lied, and that therefore there can be no contagion between Greece and Spain, Portugal, Ireland. Finally it allows the banks that loaned Greece money to claim, “We didn’t know,” when they actually did know. It also deflects the question, “Why did you loan Greece money?” The answer to the question is that Europe operates on quid pro quos and corporate welfare. Much of the money loaned to Greece returned to the source country in the form of contracts, especially for armament purchases, and many of those loans were initiated after Greek politicians were bribed to make those purchases, as in the case of the multibillion purchase of Thyssen submarines where Greek officials took 83 million in bribes, took out 4 billion in loans, and bought subs that were useless and superfluous for Greek military needs.

    Then there’s this comment: “A handful of Eurozone members, and for the most part, small and peripheral ones, were able to nearly destroy the entire union with their fiscal irresponsibility.” Public finances were actually being cut and diminishing in these peripheral countries, and in any case they were in much better shape than corporate finances. The profligacy occurred not at the state level, but at corporate level, especially in banking. The nationalization of bad private finances is what is causing all of this trauma. By focusing on social expenditures, you are deflecting from the true cause of the problem. Economist Paul de Grauwe does a fantastic job pointing this out here: http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5062

    Finally, about Rodger Mitchell’s point about Greece becoming more competitive if it could devalue, I agree that normally this would be the route to take, but Greece is a strange bird. Consider: Greece has barely any international investment. Multinationals do not land in Greece because of the bureaucracy and high corporate tax. Therefore, Greece did not lose much international business because of rising costs. Greece’s main sectors are tourism, shipping and banking. You might think Greece lost on tourism as prices rose, but that’s not the case. Visitors to Greece have increased since it joined the euro. It has been a boon for the tourism sector. Shipping obviously brings outside money into the country and remains competitive worldwide (albeit in a slump due to the recession), while banking increasingly reaps profits far afield. in fact, the big banks are making more profit in countries such as Turkey than in Greece. So, Greece is an oddbird in that devaluing inside Greece is not going to matter much in its main sectors, and indeed it may even kill the banking sector. This is probably why the Greek politicians will do almost anything to try and stay inside the euro.

  • http://rodgermmitchell.wordpress.com Rodger Malcolm Mitchell

    “Finally, about Rodger Mitchell’s point about Greece becoming more competitive if it could devalue [...]“

    Never said that. I said they would be better off out of the EU, where they could create the money to pay their bills. Perhaps you feel money creation = inflation, but that is not the case. In the U.S. oil prices = inflation, and money creation has not been related to inflation for at least the past 50 years. ( http://rodgermmitchell.wordpress.com/2009/09/24/is-inflation-too-much-money-chasing-too-few-goods/ )

    Recently, we have created vast amounts of money and are worried about deflation (oil prices are falling).

    Rodger Malcolm Mitchell

  • ps56penn62pr64

    Europe can try to integrate itself until Hell freezes over, the region and the nations within it will remain unstable unless they replace the privately-owned reserve banking system with sovereign systems, owned by national governments, that issues debt-free, national currencies. When a currency is produced as loans that must be repaid with interest, as the Euro is now, failure of the banking system is inevitable.

blog comments powered by Disqus