Newsweek on Krugman and the nationalization non-debate

Evan Thomas’s Newsweek cover story on Paul Krugman is timely, and—as with everything Thomas does—elegantly executed. I especially liked this passage:

If you are of the establishment persuasion (and I am), reading Krugman makes you uneasy. You hope he’s wrong, and you sense he’s being a little harsh (especially about Geithner), but you have a creeping feeling that he knows something that others cannot, or will not, see. By definition, establishments believe in propping up the existing order. Members of the ruling class have a vested interest in keeping things pretty much the way they are. Safeguarding the status quo, protecting traditional institutions, can be healthy and useful, stabilizing and reassuring. But sometimes, beneath the pleasant murmur and tinkle of cocktails, the old guard cannot hear the sound of ice cracking.

But when the article tries to describe how exactly Krugman’s prescription for saving the financial system differs from the Obama administration’s, it gets muddled fast:

Krugman’s suggestion that the government could take over the banking system is deeply impractical, Obama aides say. Krugman points to the example of Sweden, which nationalized its banks in the 1990s. But Sweden is tiny. The United States, with 8,000 banks, has a vastly more complex financial system. What’s more, the federal government does not have anywhere near the manpower or resources to take over the banking system.

Sweden’s government took over exactly two banks, one of which was already partly owned by the government. Sweden doesn’t have a lot of banks, so this amounted to about a quarter of the assets of the banking system. But taking over a couple of the top-five U.S. banking companies would account for a big chunk of total system assets here. And that’s really what the discussion here is about: It’s what the government should do with Citi, maybe B of A, maybe a few mid-major banks. A wholesale government takeover of all 8,000 banks is not on anybody’s agenda.

Krugman, Simon Johnson and a lot of other people think the government should be moving a lot more quickly and decisively to take over the most troubled banks and clean up their balance sheets. The Treasury approach appears to be to do some work on the balance sheets—through efforts to modify mortgages and buy up toxic assets—and then figure out what to do with the most troubled banking companies. As I’ve written before, this is really a debate about tactics, not basic questions of finance and economics. The debate involving basic questions of finance and economics is the one that’s just getting started about how we regulate the financial sector.

They’re not totally unconnected, of course: Johnson has an article in the May Atlantic arguing that a recalcitrant  financial oligarchy is standing in the way of solutions on both fronts. But I don’t get why we keep having this misleading back and forth on whether to nationalize the banks or not. I don’t get why the Obamanites keep using that  we’re-not-Sweden line, and I don’t get why the Krugmanites are so unwilling to see any of the administration’s moves as laying the groundwork for possible future nationalizations.

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  • plukasiak

    and I don’t get why the Krugmanites are so unwilling to see any of the administration’s moves as laying the groundwork for possible future nationalizations.
    _
    because Krugmanites recognize that what team Obama is doing doesn’t lay the “groundwork” for nationalization so much as bail out Wall Street at the expense of the average taxpayer prior to that nationalization. We strongly suspect that this latest “toxic asset” buyout scheme is a replay of the AIG bailout — its designed to benefit Geithner’s friends at goldman sachs, Morgan Stanley & other assorted “counter-parties”.
    _
    Letting big financial institutions fail doesn’t mean a collapse of the financial system, because there are more than enough small and medium sized banks that are ready and willing to do what these mega-banks have been doing in terms of the “global financial infrastructure”. Geithner’s sole focus is on maintaining the status quo, because change hurts the only people that he socializes with, and his perspective is completely skewed by his social set.

  • mondomandevout

    I’m one of those college students who was there to volunteer in Iowa for the first caucus on behalf of Obama (I’ve still got Joe Klein’s article archived in my mind, in which he speaks of alums of that fateful week nodding knowingly to one-another when paths crossed once more).

    As a sophomore/junior (I’m seeking transfer despite a year’s worth of nontransferable credits) to be honest I was only passingly familiar with the name ‘Paul Krugman’ until one day I asked my professor, a former member of the Illinois Commerce Commission, why economists always seemed to skew so conservative when it didn’t appear that the study necessitated such a skew. At a loss to name Democratic-friendly economists, I asked why more economists weren’t like Jeffrey Sachs, and my professor related how through personal encounters he’d determined Sachs was overrated as a leftist economist, and suggested Krugman instead.

    I quickly came to respect Mr. Krugman tremendously, second only to Obama, and if but for one fact I would give Mr. Obama and his team the benefit of the doubt over Mr. Krugman’s objections.

    That is that when it comes to tackling the financial sector, Obama does indeed appear very establishment-oriented, however else-wise ‘radically’ progressive he may be.

    Shortly after Lehman’s collapse, I asked the same professor why we couldn’t just pay off all the sub-prime mortgages in order to stabilize the economy, however structured such a program might be. From what I’d seen (correct my figures please) the value of all sub-prime mortgages was around $1 trillion and the instantaneous loss in equity in the market was around $6 trillion. Though temporary, the latter figure is in addition to the very real costs ($7 trillion?) of the measures by the government to stabilize the economy, via preferred share buys, guarantees, mortgage restructuring, and what have you.

    One conservative classmate in the room instantly started screeching at the unfairness of subsidizing the homeowners. “Yea it’s unfair, but preferable to subsidizing the banks isn’t it? And more direct to boot?” She parroted her same remark, and my professor could only comment at the sheer complexity of structuring such a deal. Surely not more complex than pricing all these troubled assets in order to buy them from the banks?, I thought (the provision at the time before Paulson moved to equity-injections).

    In short, I only know the political history of this country as far as the Bush years go, and that short amount of time has been distressing enough for me to have a very real sense of the undue influence of the super-wealthy in this country, to the extent that we are bizarrely so much more accepting of welfare to their ranks than to the poor. Obama has indeed been far too reticent to nationalize the banks, and I wonder that he isn’t confident enough in his own understanding of economics, justifiably or not, to not have to so heavily rely on the guidance of Geithner.

  • rrsafety

    In a battle between Krugman and Santelli, I’ll take Santelli. Santelli’s basic instinct that large government interventions as a medicine to forestall economic pain are likely to be worse than the disease itself. Consider me unsurprised that Newsweek doesn’t even wish to hear out such a possibility.

  • mondomandevout

    Yea, well I suggest you take a second look at Stewart’s Cramer vs. Non-Cramer segments if you think Santelli’s such a hero. You only laud him because he shares your preconceived notions, however groundless in theory they may be, you don’t give a damn about his credibility or expertise. It’s ludicrous to compare him to Krugman.

  • tc125231

    A number of us have understood your proposition on the Geithner plan. I hope you are right. But, to put this in context, the TARP cost every man woman and child in America about $250 each, and has had –so far — the primary effect of enriching people like Goldman Sachs, who got paid 100% on the dollar by AIG.

    It’s not obvious what it has done for the people who provided the money to AIG. Yes, I know that the situation is genuinely scary, and it could always be worse. Nonetheless, it’s not surprising that, in a country where the average income is around $50K, people would like to see a little more bang for their buck when doing it again. Geithner’s plan could be even more expensive.

    Yes, I know it shouldn’t be –but remember that Paulson said the TARP should hardly cost anything. Now the money’s almost gone, and there is a perception that all we have for it is a bunch of bankers whining that they never would have taken the money if they’d known there would be “terms and conditions.”

    So, for the non-ignorant, who understand your point, the primary sticking point is that this plan could be hugely expensive, and only a stepping stone along the way to nationalization.

    Look, I can stand enriching people like Goldman Sachs with my tax dollars –but only if it fixes things. It is NOT a primary goal of mine to pay taxes for the greater glory of Goldman Sachs.

  • tc125231

    I dropped a zero on my previous post. It should have been :$2500 each.”

  • donthelibertariandemocrat

    Yesterday, I looked back over my commenting, which really began in September. The first comment on the Swedish Plan is from Sept. 23rd, and is in reference to a Dougherty story and Krugman column. The first comment on a TARP hybrid plan is from Sept. 27th when William Gross floated a plan in the WaPo. Here’s a posted comment:

    “Saturday, October 4, 2008
    Problems With The Bailout
    From the NY Times article “For Treasury Dept., Now Comes Hard Part of Bailout”, I see the following problems with the plan as envisaged:

    1) Possible conflicts of interest with the administrators of the plan.

    2) Overpaying for assets.

    3) Doesn’t do enough to ease credit markets or makes it worse.

    4) When the assets are eventually sold, there is a huge and unanticipated loss.

    5) Lobbying by hedge funds, etc.

    Are there others? ”

    The first questioning about whether or not the FDIC could do this is from Oct. 9th. The question of big banks and mergers first came up on Oct. 4th, because the Tax provisions in TARP were meant to encourage big banks, mergers, and less competition. The issue of AIG bonuses turns up on Oct. 29th.

    Every comment that I have come across about PPIP so far is a variant of comments from Sept. and Oct. I am for the a version of the Swedish Plan, but I support PPIP for now, even though it’s a dreaded hybrid plan. Why?

    1) The govt still can’t seize a large bank ( Read The Economics Of Contempt Blog ), although I believe that they’re working on it.
    2) Foreign countries like China have made it plain that they want their bonds honored.
    3) Seizing banks like Banamex will involve us in politics in other countries.
    4) Although it’s a better deal, we could still lose a lot of money.
    5) Geithner is saying the right things. I have no idea how to test his sincerity except by his actions.
    6) I see the PPIP as helping with QE, albeit in a less than direct manner.
    7) We own a fair amount of these banks and AIG.

    Sad to say, we need to buy time. To me, right now, it’s all down to practical politics.

  • rrsafety

    yeah, Mondo, I’ll get my economics news from Jon Stewart… good idea …. LOL

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